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Abstract
The rising costs and large unfunded liabilities of deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) teacher retirement
systems raise questions about their eﬃcacy and viability. Reform of teacher pension plans
depends critically on reliable predictions of behavioral responses to alternative pension rules.
We estimate an option-value model of individual teacher retirement using administrative data
for Missouri teachers. The model ﬁts the observed aggregate retirement behavior very well.
We use the estimated structural parameters to simulate retirement behavior under alternative
pension rules. Our simulations show that on net the enhancements of Missouri teacher
pension beneﬁts in the 1990’s lowered the average retirement age for teachers. Conversion
from the current DB plan to a deﬁned contribution (DC) plan would have the opposite eﬀect,
and would dampen “spikes” in teacher retirement timing. The 1990’s enhancements raised
welfare for all teachers, however, the DC plan that we simulate has a mixed welfare impact,
raising welfare for teachers near retirement but reducing it for teachers with less experience.
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Teacher retirement beneﬁts represent a large and growing cost for public school districts.
Most teacher pension funds have large reported unfunded liabilities. In many cases these will
rise as the recent stock market decline fully works its way into pension fund annual reports.
However, even before the recent stock market meltdown, employer (and teacher) contribution
rates were rising. In March 2004, employer costs for retirement beneﬁts averaged 11.9 percent
of salary nationally for public school teachers. By March 2011 these had increased to 15.4
percent. For private sector managers and professionals these costs were 10.4 percent in March
2011, with no upward trend (Costrell and Podgursky, 2009, updated). Reform of teacher
pensions has been widely discussed by pension administrators and legislators. Changes have
been implemented in several states. However, reliable estimates of the ﬁscal and the staﬃng
eﬀects of such changes requires reliable estimates of the behavioral eﬀect of current and
alternative pension rules, which is the subject of the present study.
A large literature in labor economics has analyzed the eﬀects of incentives in pension sys-
tems on the timing of retirement decisions, labor turnover, and workforce quality (Friedberg
and Webb, 2005; Asch, Haider, and Aissimopoulos, 2005; Ippolito, 1997; Stock and Wise,
1990). However, little of this literature pertains to teachers. While there have been many
studies of the eﬀect of current compensation on teacher turnover and mobility (e.g., Murnane
and Olsen, 1990; Stinebrickner, 2001; Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin, 2004; Podgursky, Mon-
roe, and Watson, 2004), the literature on teacher pensions and their labor market eﬀects is
slender, but growing (Ferguson, et.al., 2006; Brown, 2009; Costrell and McGee, 2010; Fried-
berg and Turner, 2010). This issue takes on particular importance because current research
points to a major eﬀect of teacher quality on student achievement (Rivkin, Hanushek, and
Kain, 2005).
1To date, however, none of the papers examining teachers estimate structural models that
are standard in the empirical retirement literature (e.g., Stock and Wise, 1990; Berkovic
and Stern, 1991). As noted above, given concerns about the ﬁscal state of the pension
funds and staﬃng schools with qualiﬁed teachers, a study of the eﬀect of teacher pension
plan incentives on teacher retirement behavior has obvious policy relevance. A structural
economic approach provides a ﬁrmer foundation for policy simulations concerning teacher
labor markets. However, an analysis of teacher pensions has more general research interest
as well. This is a large market - roughly 3.2 million public school teachers. In addition, other
professional staﬀ (e.g., counselors and administrators) are in the same systems, yielding a
total closer to 3.7 million. While the rules of deﬁned beneﬁt pension systems vary from state
to state, the general structure of these systems are similar, as are the teachers themselves.
Thus there is reason to believe that the results of a single state study like this one would
generalize to a much larger universe.
The administrative data about the teachers and their pension systems in state data
systems are generally of high quality and an excellent resource for research on the behav-
ioral eﬀects of pension plans. The rules of the teacher pension systems are typically more
complicated than those of private sector plans, but they are readily available to outside re-
searchers. These pension rules subject teachers to exogenous and peculiar incentives that
allow researchers to study behavioral responses. Moreover, these peculiar rules have changed
over time in ways that are readily documented.2 State administrative data ﬁles also provide
highly reliable data on teacher employment histories, salaries, and the exact timing of retire-
2For example, “rule of 80” permits regular retirement when Age+Experience  80. While one might
expect experience and age to have eﬀects on retirement, there is no reason to expect an eﬀect of the sum of
the two passing a threshold of 80 to aﬀect retirement, independent of pension rules. There are other such
rules which produce sharp peaks and troughs in pension wealth accrual. See Costrell and Podgursky (2009)
for further discussion.
2ment. These administrative panel data are of very high quality compared to the household
survey data that have been used in some other studies.3
There are other interesting features of teacher pension decisions. In modeling retirement
in other markets, a worker’s information on future wages or salaries may substantially diﬀer
from that known to the researcher. However, the salaries of teachers are determined by
salary schedules and are highly predictable. Thus it is more likely that the teacher data oﬀer
a better test of the decision models commonly used in retirement research.
Finally, these exercises are usefully carried out in the framework of a structural model
rather than reduced form models, since the “Lucas critique” (originally directed to the use
of reduced-form models in macroeconomics) is relevant. Empirical regularities observed in
a reduced-form models are the outcome of responses to pension plan incentives. If those
incentives change, the empirical regularities change, possibly in complicated ways. Identiﬁ-
cation of “deep parameters” is valuable if researchers or policy-makers seek to understand
the eﬀect of changes in key features of these pension plans.
In the following section we discuss an “option value” dynamic panel model of retirement
versus work. We report estimates of model parameters and show that the model ﬁts our data
very well. We then use the estimated model to simulate the eﬀect of pension enhancements
enacted during the 1990’s and a hypothetical deﬁned contribution (DC) alternative. We also
explore the welfare eﬀects of these plan alternatives. A concluding section summarizes our
ﬁndings and suggests directions for further work in the area.
3There are tradeoﬀs. These administrative data are rich in information about the teachers, their employ-
ers, and their work histories. Unfortunately, our data ﬁle has no information about the teacher’s household.
In particular, we have no information about spousal income, or even whether the teacher is married.
32 Institutional Background
Missouri public school teachers, like nearly all public school employees, are covered by a
deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension system. In fact, Missouri public school teachers are in three
diﬀerent DB systems. Teachers in the St. Louis and Kansas City districts, less than ten
percent of teachers statewide, are covered by Social Security and are in their own pension
systems. The rest of the public school teachers in the state are not covered by the Social
Security system (as teachers) and are in a state-wide educator plan (Public School Retirement
System, PSRS).4 Our focus in this paper is on teachers in the statewide plan. From a research
perspective this is attractive since the incentives from the PSRS plan are not mingled with
those of the Social Security system. Under current rules, Missouri teachers become eligible
for a full (undiscounted) pension if they meet one of three conditions: a) sixty years of age
and at least ﬁve years of experience, b) thirty years of experience (and any age), or c) the
sum of age and years of service equals or exceeds 80 (“rule of 80”). Beneﬁts at retirement
are determined by the following formula (some variant of which is nearly universal in teacher
DB systems):
Annual Benefit = S  FAS  R (1)
where S is service years (essentially years of experience in the system), FAS is ﬁnal average
salary calculated as the average of the highest three years of salary, and R is the replacement
factor. Teachers earn 2.5 percent for each year of teaching service up to 30 years. Thus, a
teacher with 30 years experience and a ﬁnal average salary of $60,000 would receive: Annual
4The BLS reports that 72 percent of public school are covered by Social Security. State and local
employees were not covered by the 1935 Social Security Act. Amendments in the early 1950’s permitted
these employees to enter the system. Some groups of teachers (as a group) chose to enter, whereas others
did not. The result is complicated mosaic. Usually, all teachers in a state are in or out (e.g., California out,
Florida in, see Costrell and Podgursky (2009)).
4Beneﬁt = 30  $60,000  0.025= $45,000. There are several other minor adjustments to
the formula in equation (1). First, in order to provide teachers with assistance in purchasing
health insurance, the average district contribution to individual teacher health insurance is
included in FAS. Thus, if the average of the highest three salary years was $60,000 and
the average contribution to health insurance was $3,000 annually, then FAS would equal
$63,000. Second, there is a “25 and out” option that permits retirement at a reduced rate
if teachers have 25 or more years of experience. Finally, the value of R used in formula (1)
is 2.5 for experience up to 30 years and 2.55 for experience of 31 or more years.
3 A Teacher’s Retirement Decision
Our focus is on the timing of retirement. We assume that an experienced educator who is
teaching in the current year has two choices: teach next year or retire.5 In modeling the
timing of retirement, Stock and Wise (1990) (SW) develop an structural model based on
the “option value” method, in which a worker’s expected utility in period t is a function
of expected retirement in year r (with r = t,,T and T is an upper bound on age). In













where 0 < ks < 1 captures disutility of working, Y is income, and B is the pension beneﬁt.
The unobserved innovations in preferences are AR(1):
ws = ρws−1 + ϵws, ξs = ρξs−1 + ϵs.
5In this context “retire” can also mean stop teaching and collect a pension at a future date rather than
immediately.
5This speciﬁcation assumes that the disutility of work, ks, does not depend on age. This is
a problematic assumption that, as will be seen below, is at variance with our data. SW
relax this assumption by allowing ks to change monotonically with age: ks = κ( 60
age)1. The
standard speciﬁcation emerges if κ1 = 0. We adopt this more general approach.
In period t there is only one decision the worker needs to make: to retire or continue
teaching. The retirement decision is irreversible. Once a teacher retires, she cannot return
to the same job.6 Because the future is uncertain and the teacher is not risk neutral, there is
a value associated with keeping the option retirement open, hence this is termed an “option
value” model.
The expected gain from retirement at age r over retirement in the current period is





















There are three sources of uncertainty: the uncertainty of future earnings and beneﬁts, un-
certainty of survival, and uncertainty in aforementioned preference shocks. To make survival
uncertainty explicit, for a teacher alive in year t we denote the probability of survival to






















The sum of the ﬁrst three terms is a function of current salary and experience, and is
denoted gt(r). The last term
∑r−1
s=t π(sjt)(βρ)s−t(wt   ξt) is unobservable and is denoted
Kt(r) =
∑r−1
s=t π(sjt)(βρ)s−t (which depends on unknown parameters) times an error term
6Thus, we are ruling out the option of a teacher retiring and returning to a PSRS-covered job (“double-
dipping”). PSRS rules make it very diﬃcult to return to full time covered employment and collect a pension,
although part-time teaching employment (less than half time) is an option.
6νt = wt ξt, which follows νt = ρνt−1+ϵt where ϵt is assumed to be N(0,σ2). The retirement
decision can thus be formulated as choosing r = t,,T that maximizes




t = argmax gt(r)/Kt(r),
the probability that teacher retires in period t (Gt(r)  0 for all r > t) is Prob(
gt(ry)
Kt(ry)   νt).
The likelihood can be speciﬁed under a normality assumption on νt and given rules for
predicting future earnings. We assume salary is predictable under an estimated nonlinear (a
third order polynomial) function of experience.7 For estimation of the model, if a teacher
i 2 f1,..,Ig retires in period t, dit = 1, otherwise dit = 0. After retirement the teacher is
dropped out of the sample (after Ti for teacher i). For cross-section data with a teacher i
observed only in period t, the likelihood is




















where Φ(.) is the cumulative density function of standard normal and σ is the standard
deviation of νt. For panel data the likelihood is made more complicated by the serial corre-
lation of νt. Suppose a teacher is observed for period t,t+1,..,t+n and she retired in t+n,













7Missouri teachers, like nearly all public school teachers, are paid according to salary schedules that set
pay based on years of teaching experience and education credentials (frequently terminating in an MA).
Thus it is not unrealistic to treat teacher pay as a function of teaching experience, assuming all teachers
move from the BA column on the schedule over to the MA column with the passage of time. Because we
focus on late-career teachers, the degree-related salary adjustment is largely absent in the sample. The fairly








t+n) <  νt+n). By the deﬁnition of conditional probability, one can view this














































































































 νt+n) which can be expressed as ν ν νt;t+n 2 a corresponding region At;t+n in space Rn. The
marginal distribution of νt  N(0,σ2
) where σ2
 = 2
1−2. Given νt = ρνt−1+ϵt, the covariance
of ν ν νt;t+n is given by
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The log likelihood is
logL(γ,k,β,σ,ρ j Y Y Y,B B B,D D D) =
I ∑
i=1






ϕ(ν ν νt;t+n)dν ν νt;t+n, (2)



















t+n) <  νt+n, and ϕ(.) denotes multivariate normal density distribution of
8N(0,Σ Σ Σ). An obstacle to evaluating the likelihood is the large computational time of n -
dimensional integration. Even for a moderate size n (say 5), deterministic methods for
numerical integration can be prohibitively costly. In this study, we solve the problem through
Monte Carlo simulation. The covariance matrix Σ Σ Σ permits a Cholesky decomposition Σ Σ Σ =
V V VV V V
′. The algorithm for computing
∫
Ai ϕ(ν ν νt;t+n)dν ν νt;t+n is as follows: (1) Draw e e e{m} from
N(0,I) (m = 1,,M) and let ν ν ν
{m}
t;t+n = V V Ve e e{m}. (2) Use the frequency 1
M
∑M





Ai ϕ(ν ν νt;t+n)dν ν νt;t+n. I(ν ν ν
{m}
t;t+n 2 Ai) = 1 if ν ν ν
{m}
t;t+n 2 Ai and I(ν ν ν
{m}
t;t+n 2 Ai) = 0
otherwise. This sampling method is more eﬃcient in regions of high likelihood and less so
at the tails of the distribution. It is therefore suitable for MLE.
The option value model above assumes that a teacher chooses the year of retirement that
maximizes the expected present value of the utility of the salary and beneﬁt ﬂows given
current information. In a dynamic programming setting, a teacher evaluates the expectation
of the value of salary and beneﬁt ﬂow under present and future optimal choices. Hence
the option value model does not take into account the value of options in the future. The
gain from this is a simpler derivation of the empirical model. Stern (1997) shows that the
option value model may yield diﬀerent results from those obtained by dynamic programming.
Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992) argue that it is not obvious that the more sophisticated
dynamic programming model is more realistic for modeling actual retirement decisions. They
ﬁnd that the predictive performance of the option value model is comparable to that of a
dynamic programming approach. As we will see below, the SW option value model ﬁts our
data very well.
A “peak value” approach has been used in some applied retirement studies (e.g., Coile
and Gruber, 2007; Friedburg and Webb, 2005). It can be treated as a special case of the
SW model, in which the teacher chooses the timing of retirement to maximize the present
value of her expected pension wealth. This implies the following restrictions: κ = 0,γ =
91,σ = ρ = 0. Setting the discount rate β to be the inverse of one plus the nominal interest





(1+r)s t, where the expectation is with respect to survival probability.
The forward looking retirement decision model is in contrast to reduced-form models such
as commonly used probit or logit models, where the retirement decision is made in a static
setting. In a probit model, assume that the iid error term ϵit follows a normal distribution
N(0,η2), and that a teacher with characteristics x x xit retires if y∗
it = x x x′
itθ θ θ + ϵit > 0. Then












The logarithm of likelihood (3) takes the form similar to (2) with the exception that in (2)
the variables inside the normal CDF are nonlinear and depict a series of correlated decisions.
While reduced form logit or probit models may ﬁt the retirement data reasonably well,
they depict an empirical relationship between the covariates (constant, experience, and age)
and retirement decisions under the prevailing pension rules. Changing these rules potentially
changes the empirical relationship. Hence, these reduced form estimates are vulnerable to
the “Lucas critique” and are thus problematic for analyzing counterfactual outcomes under
alternative pension regimes. The forecasts of structural models, on the other hand, are
determined by pension rules and “deep” parameters characterizing the teacher preferences.
The deep parameters do not change with the pension rules, which permits experiments with
pension policies.
4 Data and Estimates
Our data consists of a cohort of 9605 Missouri teachers aged 50-55 at the beginning of the
2002-03 school year. We tracked this cohort of teachers forward to the 2008-09 school year.
Table 1 shows that roughly eighty percent of teachers in the sample are female. Over the six
10year period from the 02-03 to 07-08 school year, roughly half of the teachers in the cohort
retired.
The ﬁrst column of Table 2 reports maximum-likelihood estimates of the structural pa-
rameters in the retirement model: κ,κ1,β,γ,σ,ρ. We begin with the pooled estimates in the
ﬁrst two columns. All of the parameter estimates are statistically signiﬁcant, of the right
sign, and of reasonable magnitude. The parameter β reﬂects the rate of time preference
for the teacher, in our case suggesting a roughly four percent discount rate. The parameter
k measures the value of work versus leisure time. The disutility of working is modeled as
ks = κ( 60
age)1. If ks = 1 then there is no disutility associated with teaching. Our estimates
are κ = 0.654 and κ1 = 1.763, which imply that the disutility of working (i.e., the retirement
beneﬁt equivalent of one dollar of salary) is 0.901 at age 50, 0.653 at age 60 and 0.510 at
age 70. Figure 1 plots the relationship between estimated disutility of teaching (relative to
pension income) and age. Allowing for age-dependency in the disutility of teaching substan-
tially improves the ﬁt of the model. The second column of Table 2 shows that restricting
the measure of disutility ks to be a constant (by setting κ1 to 0) results in a large drop in
the likelihood (relative to the test statistic of χ2(1).)
The estimate of the discount factor β is about 0.96. The point estimate of γ is signiﬁcantly
less than unity, indicating risk aversion. The large value of σ indicates a good deal of
heterogeneity in preferences. This is not surprising since we have no covariates in the model.
One might expect various household and personal factors such as spouse’s pension, teacher
health, and the teacher’s preference for teaching to aﬀect the timing of retirement. These
and other factors are picked up in σ. In addition, these omitted factors tend to persist over
time, as indicated by large and signiﬁcant values for ρ.
Table 2 also reports estimates for males and females separately. The point estimates are
fairly similar, with the exception of κ1. In both cases the data support the model with age-
11dependent disutility of working. The preference parameter κ1 of male teachers is 3.316 while
that for female teachers is 1.681. This suggests that as male teachers age, their disutility
of teaching relative to retirement rises more quickly than for female teachers. In addition,
the mortality rate of general population of males is higher (0.748% at age 55) than that of
females (0.434% at the same age). These factors predict earlier retirement of male teachers.
The other estimates are similar for male and female teachers.
As noted above, a number of articles in the literature have estimated peak value models
rather than a full structural model. We also consider the peak value constrained version of
the model: k = 0,γ = 1,σ = ρ = 0,β = 0.95. With these constraints, the log-likelihood
under the peak value model is  73812.829. Two times the diﬀerence in the log-likelihood
between SW and peak value models can be used for hypothesis testing. The critical value of
χ2(5) at the 1% level is 15.09. The peak-value model is rejected overwhelmingly.
4.1 Goodness of ﬁt
For all teachers aged 50-55 in 2002 (our baseline sample), we use the estimated parameters of
the structural model and the information on these teachers in 2002 to generate the probability
that each teacher took one of the following 7 actions: retired in year 2003, retired in 2004, ...,
retired in 2008, and remained in teaching workforce in 2008. The probabilities are obtained
through Monte Carlo simulation. Speciﬁcally, for each teacher in the 2002 sample, regardless
of the actual retirement decision the teacher took, we draw 6 serially correlated error terms ϵt
(t = 2002,...,2007). If according to the SW model, with the realized error terms of ϵ2002 and
given the age, salary, and experience, the teacher should choose to retire in 2002, then for that
draw the teacher is recorded as retired in 2003. If the model predicts that teacher chooses not
to retire in 2002, then we project the 2003 salary and add one year to the age and experience.
If the model predicts retirement given the ϵ2003 draw and the new state variables, then the
12teacher is recorded as retired in 2004. We repeat the process to 2007. If model predicts the
teacher chooses not to retire up to 2007, then the teacher is recorded as a non-retiree at
the end of the sample. For each teacher we replicate the above experiment a large number
of times (100,000, changing it to 1,000,000 produces the same results). The frequency of
the simulated retirement decisions give rise to the predicted probabilities. We aggregate
the probabilities over the teachers in the 2002 sample to obtain the aggregate predicted
retirement. We present aggregated predicted and actual retirement by age, experience, and
age by experience. Comparisons of the observed and predicted distributions of the retirees
(at the time of separation) and non-retirees (who do not separate until 2008) are used to
gauge the ﬁt of the model.
Figure 2 shows the percentage of teachers in the 50-55 age cohort in 2002 who remain in
teaching in each year until 2008. The predicted survival rate is fairly close to the observed
rate except in the ﬁrst year. The predicted 2003 retirement of the cohort is larger than the
observed rate. We believe that this is related to our choosing (due to data constraints) a ﬁxed
ﬁve-year window of teachers nearing retirement. Table 1 shows that teachers who retired
in diﬀerent years have diﬀerent characteristics. Those who choose to retire in 2002 (and
retired in 2003) tend to be more experienced in 2002 but retire at relatively younger ages
(the average is just over 53 years old.) The young retirement age in 2002 is a consequence
of selecting a sample of 50-55 year-olds. We do not include the teachers who retired in 2002
and who are older than 55. Hence the number of retirees in 2003 in our panel substantially
understates actual retirement in that year.
Suppose the data are generated by the option value model, where each teacher is associ-
ated with an unobserved preference shock νt in year t. Recall that the marginal condition for
retirement is
gt(ry)
Kt(ry)   νt, and νt has a positive serial correlation and unconditional mean of
zero. Those with a high value of  ν2002 also have high values of  ν2001 and are more likely
13to retire before 2002. The remaining teachers who are eligible for retirement but who remain
in the teaching workforce are more likely to have a low value of  ν2001, thus low  ν2002.
The model simulation assumes zero mean in ν2002, hence it over-estimates the probability
of retirement in 2003. In the later part of the sample period such sample selection bias is
greatly reduced.
The observed percentage of the non-retired teachers in 2008 is 49.9%, and the estimated
rate is 50.1%. The aggregate behavior at the end of the sample is better matched by the
model than that at the beginning of the sample. We noted above that sample selection
adversely aﬀects the ﬁt in early years of the sample. In addition, the teachers who retire in
the later part of the sample period or who remain in teaching workforce to the end of the
sample period are observed more times than those who retried early (and thus dropped out
of the sample). The former thus carry a heavier weight in the likelihood function. The MLE
is obtained through matching the sample observations, thus the parameters are selected so
the behavior of those with heavier weight are better matched by the model.
The remaining charts explore model ﬁt by age and experience. The left panel of Figure
3 plots the observed (black solid line) and predicted (dotted line) age distribution of the
teachers who choose to retire. The two distributions are very closely matched, with the
exception that the model predicts more earlier retirement (at age 50) than observed. In the
right panel of the ﬁgure we plot the age distributions of non-retirees. The predicted and
observed distributions are matched almost perfectly (note that the youngest non-retiree in
2007 is 55 years old).
Figure 4 plots the observed (black solid line) and predicted (dotted line) experience
distributions at the separation year (for the retired) or the end of the sample period (for the
non-retired). The two distributions in the left panel of Figure 4 are reasonably matched.
The predicted distribution overpredicts the spikes corresponding to the 25-and-out rule, and
14under-predicts the spike at 30 years experience. By comparison, the experience distribution
of the predicted non-retired is more closely matched to that of the observed.
The above comparisons are based on marginal distributions (e.g., for each age, retirement
rates were averaged over all levels of experience.) Because age and experience are correlated,
a more complete picture of model ﬁt is in Figure 5, where we compare the observed joint age-
experience distribution versus simulated counterparts. Overall the estimated model ﬁts the
joint age-experience distribution of retirement very well. Figure 5 shows that the teachers
who are predicted to retire at lower ages by the SW model tend to have high experience
(with 25 years or more). Hence, the over- prediction of retirement for the low age/high (more
than 25 years) experience group may be due to the sample selection issue discussed above.
The structural model is not merely useful for explaining history. A potentially important
use is as a tool for studying alternative pension policies. We turn to that task in the next
section.
5 Evaluation of Pension Plan Changes
In this section we use the structural estimates to explore the behavioral and welfare eﬀects of
pension plan changes. Given the lively policy debate in this area, there are many options one
might explore. We restrict our attention to two. First, we examine the eﬀect of pension plan
enhancements enacted during the 1990’s. Like many states, Missouri substantially increased
the generosity of the teacher plan during the bull market of the 1990’s. We examine the
eﬀect of these enhancements on teacher retirement behavior. In response to rising costs for
maintaining the DB pension plans, several states have closed the traditional plans and put
new teachers into DC plans (or introduced “hybrid” plans, which combine a DB and DC
plan). Many other states are considering such reforms. Thus, we consider a DC alternative
15plan.
5.1 Eﬀect of recent pension enhancements
As noted, the Missouri legislature passed a series of pension enhancements during the 1990’s.
Nearly every year between 1992-93 through 2000-01, when the last signiﬁcant enhancement
passed, one or more rule changes were implemented which increased teacher pension wealth
(i.e., by either increasing the value of the pension annuity or increasing the number of
years over which it can be collected). Ni, Podgursky, and Ehlert (2009) estimate that
these enhancements raised the aggregate peak value pension wealth of the 2007 teaching
workforce by roughly four billion dollars. The most expensive of these included an early
retirement provision (“25 and out”), increases in the multiplier from 2.3 to 2.5 percent,
and introduction of “rule of 80” for regular retirement. Rather than examine all of these
enhancements individually, we simplify the analysis by simply “turning back to clock” to
1995.
5.2 DB to DC conversion
Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that the current deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) plans
create strong incentives for retirement around the years associated with peak value of pension
wealth. This pension-induced incentive can “pull” teachers who do not enjoy teaching to
stay for additional years to collect the pension and “push” teachers who enjoy teaching into
retirement sooner than they would otherwise prefer. Some states are considering a switch
to DC plans, in total, or partially in “hybrid” plans, to reduce ﬁscal exposure as well as
eliminate these perverse incentives. 8
8Several studies in the general literature on retirement have examined the eﬀect of transitions from DB
to DC plans, e.g., Friedburg and Webb(2005), Poterba, Rauh, Venti, Wise (2007).
16We consider the following DC plan: teachers contribute a mandatory ﬁxed percent of
salary (c = 10%), matched by an equivalent employer contribution into each teacher’s ac-
count each year. A teacher’s account accumulates with annual contributions and nominal
investment returns of R 1 = 4% on the fund balance. We treat this as a guaranteed return
(e.g., as with TIAA or a “cash balance” pension plan). The inﬂation rate is assumed to
be i = 3%. The account is portable and teachers can withdraw from the account at any
age without penalty. When a teacher retires, the contribution to the account stops and an
insurance company provides an actuarially fair annuity (B) equal to the cash value in the
teacher’s account.
For a teacher with a DC account value Wt, age a in year t, and a maximum life of 101
years, let the expected nominal ﬂow of the annuity be Bt+n in the n th year of retirement.
The retiree survives to t + n with conditional probability π(t + njt). The expected account
value and the expected payment evolve as
Wt+n = Wt+n−1R   Bt+n, Bt+n = π(t + njt)(1 + i)
nB.




n=1 π(t + njt)(1+i
R )n.
(4)
The remaining question is how to determine the DC account value for a teacher who is
in the current DB plan. We consider the following scenario. All teachers in the DB plan in
2002 have cash balance W based on the current rules of the DB plan.9 Further accrual of
pension wealth under the old plan is halted. Going forward the value in this account grows
by the nominal interest rate (on the fund balance) and further annual contributions from
teachers and districts.
9We compute the cash value of the DB accruals using a 2 percent real discount rate and standard life
tables. For references on the choice of the real discount rate, see Grissom, Koedel, Ni, Podgursky, (2011).
17With this initial value in the DC plan, the teacher considers whether to retire or continue
to work as in the SW model: a worker’s expected utility in period t is a function of expected
retirement in year r (with r = t,,T and T = 101 is an upper bound on age). In period t,













where Y is income and B is pension beneﬁt and the unobserved errors are AR(1): ws =
ρws−1 + ϵws, ξs = ρξs−1 + ϵs.
The beneﬁt Bs = B given in (4) with Wt replaced by the real value Wr
(1+i)r t. Note the
account nominal value in year r > t is the value of accumulation of contributions plus the
compound return of the wealth in period t: Wr = WtRr−t +
∑r
k=t+1 2cYkRr−k.
Because the DC rules are simpler than the DB rules, we are able to formalize the marginal
condition for retirement time under the DC rules and thereby gain some intuition about the
tradeoﬀ between work and retirement. Suppose in the absence of unobserved preference
shifters the teacher with salary Yt and pension wealth Wt is indiﬀerent of retiring in year t
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(6) implies that for a given age, under the DC plan a teacher chooses to retire when the
ratio of salary to pension wealth is lower than a constant. The dynamics of the pension





Yt ) + 2c
Yt 1
Yt . The pension wealth/salary
ratio is increasing in the return to savings and increases over time as the real salary growth
slows down at the later stage of teachers’ careers. At some point the ratio Wt
Yt is large enough
to render the LHS of (6) lower than the RHS of (6).
5.3 Policy simulations
We now examine the eﬀect of the 1990’s enhancements and our DC alternative plan on
retirement behavior. In examining the goodness of ﬁt of the model in the previous section,
we were constrained to the seven year window of our panel data. In simulating the eﬀect of
these policies, there is no reason to restrict our time horizon so narrowly, thus we extend the
forecast horizon to 20 years, by which time nearly all of these teachers will have retired.
Because the pension annuity B is increasing in initial pension wealth, the level at which
pension wealth is set in the year of initial conversion from DB to DC plans aﬀects the
retirement decision. We set this initial level of pension wealth by discounting the ﬂow of
annuity payments at a two percent real rate and assuming a standard life table for survival
rates. For teachers at or near the “peak value” of pension wealth, this can be an attractive
option, the DC plan eliminates the penalty on working after reaching the peak value under
the current rules (i.e., the “pushing out” eﬀect of the current rules.) However, the DC plan
does not necessarily postpone retirement. For some teachers, it is optimal to retire earlier
under the DC than under the current rules. Whether this is case depends on the teacher’s
age, experience, and the initial 2002 pension wealth lump sum payment. As condition (6)
shows, under the DC plan a teacher retires when the salary/pension wealth ratio is below
a threshold. The higher the initial pension wealth, the earlier the retirement under the DC
plan.
We begin by comparing survivor functions under the three regimes in Figure 6. Here we
19see that under the 1995 rules the teachers remain employed at a higher rate over the period
2003-2010 than under the current rules and the gap narrows to insigniﬁcance by 2011-2021.
Conversion to the DC plan would result in slightly higher retirement in the year 2003 than
under the 1995 rules but possibly lower or higher than that under the current rules depending
on initial pension wealth. Under the DC plan, the teaching survival rate declines much more
slowly than under the two DB plans, regardless of the retirement in initial years. At the end
of the forecast period, about 7% of the teachers are predicted to remain teaching under the
DC plan, while around 1% are predicted to do so under the DB rules.
We plot the marginal distributions by age and experience under the current rules, the
1995 rules, and the DC plan in Figures 7 to 9. Note that these ﬁgures characterize the
distribution of the teachers predicted to retire within 20 years. Because under the DC plan
more teachers remain teaching at the end of the predicted period than under the DB plans,
the magnitude of the curves are not entirely comparable. Figure 7 shows that under the 1995
rules retirement would have occurred at an older age. Under these rules, the retirement age
distribution peaks at 60, and that there is a lower percentage of retirement occurring at age
50 and 51. 10 Under the DC plan, Figure 7 also conﬁrms what we learn from the predicted
survival rates, that for those who are predicted to retire, retirement comes earlier than under
the 1995 rules but later than under the current rules. There is a substantial shift toward
later retirement. This illustrates the well understood proposition that DC plans eliminate
the“pull” that makes teachers stay longer as they approach the peak of pension wealth, and
the “push” that makes teachers retire early as they pass the peak of pension wealth under
the DB plan). Hence the age distribution under a DC plan is less concentrated.
10The distribution of retirement age and/or experience depends on the forecasting horizon. In a shorter
time frame, say 6 years, the retirement age distribution under the 1995 rules are more similar to that under
the current rules than Figure 8 depicts.
20The experience distributions of retirement also diﬀer under the 1995 rules and the current
rules. Figure 8 shows that under the 1995 rules retirement experience is more concentrated
at 30 and there is no spike at 25 years of experience. Under the 1995 rules, retirement is
more likely to occur later in a career. The primary reasons are absence of “25 and out” and
the “rule of 80.” Under the DC plan the retirement experience distribution is ﬂatter than
under the current rules. Again, this conﬁrms what we learned from the age distributions,
that the DC plan eliminates the“pull” and “push” incentives.
Figure 9 shows the joint age-experience distributions of the retirement years under the
three regimes. Under the current rules, there is a ridge reﬂecting the “rule 80”. Under
the 1995 rules, the retirement age-experience distribution is more concentrated at age 60 or
experience of 30 years, forming an “L.” The DC plan smooths out the retirement distribution
making retirement less concentrated on arbitrary age and experience levels.
Using the structural estimates, we can examine eﬀect of pension rules on teachers’ welfare.
Let the expected utility of a teacher in 2002 under the current rules, the 1995 rules, and
the DC rules be Ucurrent, U1995, UDC. Suppose after we multiply the stream of salary and
pension beneﬁts under the current rules by a constant τ to make the utility under the
current rules equal to that under the 1995 rules with the actual salary in 2002. The constant
τ equals a ratio of expected utility to the power of 1
: τ = ( U1995
Ucurrent)
1





. A τ lower than unity means the teacher is better oﬀ under the current rules
relative to alternative rules.
The relationship between relative welfare and experience is illustrated by Figure 10. The
experienced teachers do best under the DC rules and worst under the 1995 rules. Figure
11 plots τ for subsamples of teachers who retired in diﬀerent years. The chart shows that
teachers who retired in 2003 would gain under the DC plan, because they would gain access
to the same pension wealth with an added option of continuing to teach and letting the
21pension wealth accumulate. For the 2003 retirees with long service experience, the option of
teaching is particularly valuable. Those who are not retired in 2008, who tend to have short
service experience in 2002, under the DC plan that starts with 2002 pension wealth would
ﬁnd their utility reduced. This is because under the current rules, the pension wealth is a
nonlinear function of experience, accelerating as the teacher approaches the late stage of her
career. Stopping the service experience clock in 2002 disproportionably reduced the pension
wealth of the low experience teachers. This discussion suggests that, in order to convert
from a DB plan to a DC plan without reducing the welfare of teachers and without raising
the cost, there needs to be experience-dependent compensation. Figure 12 shows that the
relationship between gender and welfare under alternative rules. Males do better under the
DC rules and do worse under the 1995 rules. Figure 12 is based on the estimates for female
and male samples (the third column of Table 2 for females and ﬁfth column of Table 2 for
males.) Using the estimates of the full sample (column 1 of Table 2) produces qualitatively
similar plots.
Under the 1995 rules, the teachers are uniformly worse oﬀ than under the current rules,
the τ ratio is 92   95% on average, depending the retirement year under the current rules.
More experienced teachers suﬀer the largest losses under the 1995 rules. Under the DC rules,
the welfare impact varies. Averaging over all teachers in the 2002 cohort, the mean of τ is
91% under the DC plan. The welfare comparison depends on the details of the rules. If
we allow for more generous provision of the initial pension wealth under the DC plan, the
predicted behavior pattern under the DC plan does not change but more teachers will have
a τ ratio above unity.
226 Conclusion
Policy discussions about teacher quality and teacher “shortages” often focus on recruitment
and retention of young teachers. However, attention has begun to focus on the incentive
eﬀects of teacher retirement beneﬁt systems, particularly given their rising costs and their
large unfunded liabilities. In this paper we estimate a structural model of teacher retirement
for Missouri teachers and use it to estimate the eﬀect of pension rules on the timing of
retirement. The model ﬁts the data very well, and nicely mimics the sharp spikes associated
with certain age and experience combinations. We used the structural model to evaluate the
eﬀect of pension enhancements enacted during the 1990’s and a hypothetical DC pension
plan. Enhancements during the 1990’s are found to have lowered the retirement age for
teachers. A DC (or cash balance) alternative plan would greatly ameliorate the spikes
and smooth out retirements. The 1990’s enhancements increased the welfare of all teachers,
although the beneﬁts vary with age and experience. DC plans have a mixed eﬀect, improving
welfare for some teachers and lowering it for others. Male teachers in our sample on average
beneﬁt more from a DC conversion than female teachers.
As states consider reform of teacher pension plans, behavioral econometric models can
be of great value in estimating labor market and ﬁscal eﬀects of reforms. Moreover, thanks
to substantial ﬁnancial support from the U.S. Department of Education, many states have
built extensive longitudinal databases on educators and students that can support this type
of research.
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25Table 1: Sample Averages by the Year of Retirement
Retirement number age experience male
Year of teachers
All 2002 9605 56.04 24.15 0.20
2003 640 53.09 28.53 0.29
2004 862 53.58 28.60 0.26
2005 972 54.42 28.01 0.24
2006 822 55.39 27.73 0.21
2007 778 56.39 26.86 0.20
2008 719 57.44 26.37 0.19
Not Retired 4812 57.04 20.61 0.17
Note: The sample of Missouri PSRS teachers are age 50-55 in 2002. “All 2002” denotes
the total cohort of 9605 in the base year. The rows with year labels are averages over all
teachers who retired in that year. “Not Retired” are teachers who remained employed in
2008 at the end of the panel. The average age and experience are at the year of separation.
Male=1 for male teachers.
26Table 2: MLE Estimates of Structural Parameters
Parameters Whole Sample Female Male
Full Model Constant κ Full Model Constant κ Full Model Constant κ
κ 0.653 0.675 0.654 0.686 0.711 0.717
(0.009) ( 0.009) ( 0.012) ( 0.013 ) (0.028 ) (0.029 )
κ1 1.765 0 1.681 0 3.316 0
( 0.086) ( 0.069 ) (0.456 )
β 0.959 0.967 0.959 0.967 0.957 0.965
( 0.028) (0.031) (0.035 ) ( 0.042 ) (0.077 ) (0.077)
γ 0.670 0.668 0.669 0.672 0.670 0.674
( 0.034 ) (0.040) (0.045) ( 0.057 ) (0.111) ( 0.070 )
σ 2799.201 2729.768 2760.441 2716.468 3765.290 3590.589
( 136.972) (175.244) ( 214.142) (293.034 ) (811.277) ( 415.888 )
ρ 0.509 0.573 0.512 0.628 0.478 0.509
(0.041) (0.042) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.087 ) (0.09) ( 0.070 )
log-likelihood -12833.539 -12939.789 -10050.364 -10133.786 -2776.343 -2802.565
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
27Figure 1: Value of Salary relative to Pension and Survival Rate from Retirement
















Discount of Salary Relative to Pension
Note for Figure 1: The ﬁgure plots the age-dependency of disutility of work, ks = ( 60
age)1; based on
estimates of  and 1 in the ﬁrst column of Table 2.
Figure 2: Survival Rate: Estimated and Observed
Year









Survial Rate by Year
Note for Figure 2: The observed survival rate pertains to all teachers in the sample year. The simulated
survival rate are based on the estimates in the ﬁrst column of Table 2.
28Figure 3: Observed and Simulated Age Distributions of Retired and Non-retired Teachers





















Distribution by age, non retired
Note for Figure 3: The observed age pertains to all teachers at the year of retirement (for the left panel)
or the non-retired at the end of the sample period (for the right panel). The simulation is based on the
estimates in ﬁrst column of Table 2.
Figure 4: Observed and Simulated Experience Distributions of Retired Teachers









Distribution by exp, retired










Distribution by exp, non retired
Note for Figure 4: The observed experience pertains to all teachers at the year of retirement (for the left
panel) or the non-retired at the end of the sample period (for the right panel). The simulation is based on
the estimates in the ﬁrst column of Table 2.
29Figure 5: Observed and Simulated Joint Retirement Age-Experience Distribution for Retired
Teachers
Experience

























Note for Figure 5: The simulation is based on the estimates in the ﬁrst column of Table 2.
Figure 6: Survival Rate Under Alternative Policies
Year










Survival Rate Under Alternative Pension Rules
Note for Figure 6: The simulated survival rates are based on the estimates in the ﬁrst column of Table 2,
under alternative pension rules.
30Figure 7: Retirement Age Distribution Under Alternative Policies









Distribution of retired by age under alternative policies 
Note for Figure 7: The simulation is based on the estimates in the ﬁrst column of Table 2.
Figure 8: Retirement Experience Distribution Under Alternative Policies










Distribution of retired by exp under alternative policies
Note for Figure 8: The simulation is based on the estimates in the ﬁrst column of Table 2.





























































Note for Figure 9: The simulation is based on the estimates in the ﬁrst column of Table 2.
Figure 10: Salary-Equivalent Utility Ratio Relative to the Current Rules by Experience
























Note for Figure 10: The simulation is based on the estimates in the ﬁrst column of Table 2. A ratio less
than unity means the teacher is better oﬀ under the current rules relative to the alternative rules.
32Figure 11: Salary-Equivalent Utility Ratio Relative to the Current Rules by Retirement Year





























Note for Figure 11: The simulation is based on the estimates in the ﬁrst column of Table 2. A ratio lower
than unity means the teacher is better oﬀ under the current rules relative to the alternative rules.
Figure 12: Salary-Equivalent Utility Ratio Relative to the Current Rules by Teacher Gender



















Note for Figure 12: The simulation is based on the estimates in the third column of Table 2 (for females)
and ﬁfth column of Table 2 (for males). A ratio lower than unity means the teacher is better oﬀ under the
current rules relative to the alternative rules.
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